We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from two microcredit programs in Eritrea. Using the results from this survey, this paper aims to provide new insights on the empirical relevance of the homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea. Since the methodology to test for homogeneous matching needs estimating risk behaviour, the paper also provides new evidence on risk behaviour of members of microcredit groups in Eritrea. Our main results strongly indicate that groups are formed heterogeneously. Most importantly, we do not find support for the matching frictions hypothesis, in the sense that even if we control for matching frictions, credit groups in Eritrea do not seem to consist of borrowers of the similar risk type.
Introduction
The performance of microfinance institutions has been debated quite extensively in the literature (for a recent survey, see Morduch 1999) . This debate has focused on the (unconventional) methods that microfinance institutions use to improve borrowers' payback behaviour. The theoretical literature has especially dealt with the implications of group lending practices with jointly liable borrowers (see e.g. Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999) .
1 A joint liability contract specifies that the entire group is liable for loans that are given to individual group members. A well-known example is the Grameen Bank's group lending program. It has been emphasised that group lending with joint liability may lead to peer-monitoring or peerpressure among group members which reduces problems of moral hazard and enforcement (Stiglitz, 1990 and Besley and Coate, 1995) . The reason is that a high joint liability component in the debt contract provides incentives to borrowers to choose a safe investment project.
A recent group of theoretical papers has emphasised that joint liability induces group members to self-select each other (e.g. Ghatak, 2000) . These papers argue that the optimal outcome is one in which all borrowers with the same probability of success match together (homogeneous matching). It has also been argued that the optimality of homogeneous matching only holds in a frictionless world (Sadoulet and Carpenter, 2001 and references This paper takes up the challenge by aiming to examine the empirical relevance of the homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea. We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from two microcredit programmes in Eritrea. 2 The survey includes questions related to the group formation process, and provides information that can be used to test the matching frictions hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some information on microcredit groups in Eritrea. Section 3 surveys the group formation and homogeneous matching literature that is most closely related to our paper. In Section 4 we explain the methodology we use to test the matching frictions hypothesis. In Section 5 we explain how we measure risk, a variable that we need to test for homogeneous matching. Section 6 presents two groups of independent variables that are assumed to affect risk behavior. In this section we also apply factor analysis to regroup these variables in a smaller number of factors. In Section 7, we estimate risk behavior. The results of this equation are used in Section 8 to test whether homogeneous matching holds if matching frictions are accounted for. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Organisational profile of the group lending programs in Eritrea.
In Eritrea there are two microfinance institutions. The first is the Saving and Credit Programme (SCP), which operates as a component of the Eritrean community development fund (EDCF) since July 1996. The other is the Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme (SZSCS) that has been launched by the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD) in 1994.
The saving and credit program ECDF/SCP
The government of Eritrea, the World Bank (IDA) and loans and grants from donors are the main sources of funds for ECDF/SCP. The aim of the SCP is to provide financial services to the vulnerable group in the rural and urban areas who have no access to formal banking services. Grassroots-based solidarity groups owning and operating "Village Banks" will form the backbone of the program.
While its immediate objective is to provide access to credit and saving to people who are outside the orbit of the formal banking network, its long term objective is to strengthen its institutional setting and together with SZSCS, establish the legal, regulatory and judicial framework for the microfinance sector of Eritrea.
The SCP is principally based on the creation of autonomously functioning Village Banks, "VB," typically serving 35-105 members. The village bank is administered at the village level through a saving and credit unit made up of three members. The village/ area administrator acts as a chairperson while the other two from client members are responsible for accounts and record keeping. All loan applications are processed in the village bank before they are forwarded to the regional SCP credit officer for final decisions and payments.
However, repeated loans are processed during VB monthly meetings and loans are granted on the spot.
Borrowers are allowed to select loan maturity periods instead of requiring that all borrowers comply with the fixed loan terms. Loans range from 1000 to 10000 Nakfas, although individuals are allowed to withdraw less if they want to. SCP charges a 16% interest rate, which is higher than what the commercial banks in Eritrea charge.
Beneficiaries will be eligible for SCP credit if and only if they are members of a solidarity group (SG). The solidarity group should consist of 3-7 members. The SG has to be governed by the principles of joint liability and members should not belong to the same family. Group members become eligible for loans only after having successfully accumulated 10 % mandatory savings within a period of three months.
The Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme (SZSCS)
The main objective of the Scheme is to provide underprivileged people access to credit. In addition it has the objective of strengthening the institutional capacity of the scheme.
The foundation of the scheme consists of 5-7 member credit and saving groups (CSGs) who are established based on the joint liability principles. The credit and saving groups elect five members to a Village Credit and Savings Committee (CSC). Loan applications forwarded by borrowing groups are screened and approved by the CSC. Once approved by the CSC the credit officer will forward the loan after further evaluation to the borrowing group in one of the monthly group meetings. Saving is mandatory and groups have to save 5 % of the requested loan amount before requesting a loan. Loans range between Nakfa 100 and 8000 and the maturity period is determined based on a mutual understanding between the loan officer and the borrower. The scheme charges an interest rate of 14 %.
Other literature on group formation and homogeneous matching
Most of the matching literature draws heavily from the work of Becker (1993) , who has worked extensively on marriage matching theory. Ghatak (1999) presents a simple model why self-selection of groups will lead to homogeneous matching. Here we explain the main insights.
The main reason why the theoretical literature argues that borrowers with equal risk profiles will form groups is that the value of having a safe partner is positive for all individuals and increasing in the own probability of success. This implies that the gain for a risky borrower of joining a group with a safe borrower is always lower than the loss for a safe borrower of forming a group with a risky borrower. Hence, a risky borrower can not crosssubsidise a safe borrower in order to be accepted as a partner, leading to groups containing partners of equal risk.
One of the most sophisticated theoretical models on the homogeneous matching hypothesis is due to Ghatak (2000) . He shows that if lenders are able to offer a continuum of debt contracts, containing different values for the interest rate and the joint liability component, incentive compatible separating equilibria may result. The safe types prefer a combination of a high joint liability component and a low lending rate, whereas the opposite will hold for a risky borrower. In this way, a lender may obtain information on the type of the borrower.
Xinhau Gu (2000) who is able to insure a partner in need, refuses to pay for him, he will lose together with other member's access to future loans from the program because of the joint liability principle.
Alongside these insurance arrangements there exists transfer payments between members when both members are successful to remunerate the safe one for covering for the risky one in times of need. Thus, this insurance arrangement is taken to be an important part of the group formation process. To this end, Sadoulet's model suggests a non-monotonic matching pattern in which safer borrowers will always form groups heterogeneously with partners riskier than themselves. Middle-type borrowers match either heterogeneously with safer borrowers or homogeneously with borrowers of their type depending on whether these are available.
Finally, the riskier borrowers match homogeneously.
Armendariz De Aghion and Gollier (2000) state that, in urban economies with heterogeneous, anonymous, and relatively mobile borrowers, random (rather than assortative) matching is incentive compatible for all types of borrowers. A particular feature of their paper is that they assume that borrowers do not know each other. They show that crosssubsidisation among members provides a kind of a collateral that reduces the negative externalities from risky to safe borrowers. The main implication of their work is that, as we move away from village economies by allowing imperfect information, assortative matching no longer leads to an equilibrium, and yet group lending can improve efficiency and enhance welfare.
There are few empirical studies available that have rigorously tested the homogeneous matching hypothesis. Most empirical studies have simply assumed that homogeneous matching takes place. Some studies, however, provide some insights. For instance, Tassel (2000), for groups belonging to BancoSol, Bolivia, found that groups match heterogeneously in unobservable business characteristics.
The only empirical paper available that has rigorously tried to investigate the matching of group members is the one by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) . For credit groups in Guatemala they estimated the relationship between risk and the level of risk heterogeneity in the individual groups, explicitly accounting for the endogeneity of group formation and of borrowers' choice of project risk. Their results show that borrowers in Guatamala group heterogeneously, and that the heterogeneity can not be explained by matching frictions. In line with the theoretical paper by Sadoulet (1999) , they suggest that borrowers might want to form heterogeneous groups in order to set up insurance arrangements.
The methodology: The role of matching frictions
We follow the methodology set out by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) . The reader is referred to their paper for a detailed explanation of the methodology. The main problem we have to deal with is as follows. The matching frictions theory states that homogeneous matching only holds in a frictionless world, and that all heterogeneity comes from matching frictions. This implies that there should be no statistically significant relationship between first best risk (risk in a frictionless world) and heterogeneity. In order to test this theory, we need indicators for first-best risk and matching frictions. The problem is that these variables are not observable. Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) solve this problem as follows. They start by arguing that with matching frictions the full system of equations (the structural model) can be specified as:
where h i is a measure for risk heterogeneity, r i is actual risk, 
How to measure risk?
The first step in the analysis is to develop a measure for the risk of a borrower's repayment strategy, which is needed to estimate the risk equation (equation 4). Unfortunately, risk is not directly measurable, and therefore has to be proxied by an (admittedly imperfect) indicator. In line with Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) , we proxy risk ( r ) by:
and r i = 0 for P i ² S where P i is the loan payment due per month (loan payments are once per month for the credit programmes) 3 and S i is the amount the borrower reported having saved one weak before the due date to cover the loan payments. 4 The risk indicator varies between 0 and 1. The higher the percentage amount saved a week before the repayment date, the lower is the risk of a borrower's repayment strategy. Table 1 gives information on the risk measure, and the variables used to construct this measure. The table also provides data on the credit amount. Figure 1 gives a kernel distribution of r.
<insert 
Variables proxying for first-best risk and matching frictions
The next step in the analysis is to determine which variables possibly affect risk, which of those variables are related to first-best risk and which of them are related to matching frictions. Hence, referring to equation 4 above, we need to determine a vector of variables X (first best) and f (matching frictions).
Matching frictions (f)
Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) NUMBER, LDIST and VISIT have to do with the (possibility of) monitoring and screening each other's activities. More visits among members, and a lower distance between members probably increase screening possibilities. More group members tend to increase monitoring efforts, but there is also more scope for free riding. PROBLEM and OTHER refer to possibilities to obtain credit from other sources. OTHER directly measures whether a borrower has been able to raise funds from other sources than the microfinance institution.
PROBLEM measures repayment problems in the past, and may give an indication of future possibilities to raise credit. ACORD and CHANGE are not directly related to the issues mentioned so far, but, as will become clear later, they have been included since they are highly correlated with one of the other indicators from this list.
First-best risk (X)
We assume that first-best risk can be picked up by variables that are directly related to the socio-economic situation of the borrower. We consider the following variables: Table 3 provides data on the remaining independent variables.
<insert Table 3 about here>
The table shows that the average borrower is 46 years old, with an average monthly income (INC) of 1017 Nakfas. Trading is the main occupation of the majority of the borrowers (63%), followed by farming (17 %). The remainder is distributed between services, daily labourers, and others. Often borrowers have different occupations at the same time, for instance, food vending and traditional restaurant. The borrowers sell articles ranging from food items to clothing and provide services such as the provision of hot meal, pubs, local beverages and teashops (latter information is not in table). The number of members per group varies between 3 and 8, with an average of 4. In the median group, 60% is woman. The average distance between group members' business is about 500 meters.
Regrouping of the variables
The concepts matching frictions and first-best risk are latent variables, which are not directly observable. Above, we have selected a group of variables that is assumed to be related to matching frictions, and a group of variables that is assumed to be related to first-best risk. In order to better account for the high collinearity between some of the variables within the two groups, and in order to test whether we can reduce the number of independent variables by constructing a smaller amount of new composite variables, we performed a multiple factor analysis (MFA).
We started by applying a factor analysis on the indicators of the group of variables related to matching frictions. The analysis suggests that 11 indicators in this group can be decomposed into 3 underlying factors. The two remaining indicators (PROBLEM and OTHER) are left out of this analysis since they have very low factor loadings, even if more underlying factors are allowed for. The factor loadings of the analysis are given in Table 4 .
<insert Table 4 about here>
The first factor mainly has to do with KNOW and INTEG, suggesting that the underlying factor in this case relates to information members have about each other before they formed a group. ACORD and NUMBER mainly determine the second factor. NUMBER has a negative factorloading, which suggests that, with respect to our sample, the average amount of members in credit groups from the ACORD (SCSZS) system is lower than that of the SCP microfinance system. A closer look at the data set confirms this: the average number of members in credit groups from the SCP is 5.2, whereas it equals 3.6 for the ACORD (SCSZS)
system. The positive factor loading on VISIT suggests that members of credit groups from the ACORD system visit each other more regularly than those of the SCP system. The third factor mainly has to do with PURP and to a lower extent with ACTIV. This gives the impression that in this case the underlying factor relates to information members have about each other's business, after the group has been formed.
In the remainder of the analysis we will use the three factors, instead of the 11 original indicators. We interpret FACTOR1 and FACTOR3 as factors that primarily have to do with the asymmetry of information among group members. FACTOR1 picks up information before forming the group, FACTOR3 picks up information after the group has been formed.
FACTOR2 primarily relates to being a member of a credit group within the ACORD microfinance system. This factor might be important for risk taking since it strongly correlates with the number of members within a group. This gives information on a possible peer monitoring effort. Armendariz de Aghion (1999, proposition 3, p.95) states "A larger group size tends to increase peer monitoring effort, due to a joint-responsibility, a cost-sharing, and a commitment effect. However… "a larger group size (also) increases the scope for free riding in debt-repayment decisions.
We also tried a factor analysis on the indicators for first-best risk. However, here the factor analysis showed that it is not possible to combine the indicators into a smaller group of underlying factors. The number of factors that has to be taken into account to accept the null hypothesis of enough factors is almost equal to the original amount of indicators. Therefore, we decided to proceed with the individual first-best indicators in the remainder of the analysis.
Estimating risk
The next step in the analysis is to examine the possible empirical relevance of our matching frictions and first-best risk variables for explaining risk of a borrower's liquidity strategy. In other words, the next step is the estimation of equation (4).
The dependent variable is the proxy for risk, r, which we have constructed. The independent variables are the 8 first-best risk indicators, the three factors related to matching frictions, and the remaining two variables (PROBLEM and OTHER), which are also related to matching frictions. To examine non-linear effects we also tried quadratic terms, but, except for the quadratic term of LINC (LINC2), none of them appeared to be significant, and hence were left out of the analysis.
The constructed dependent variable is censored between 0 and 1. Therefore, we estimate with the TOBIT estimation technique with left and right censoring (using NORMAL distribution of error terms). We also present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, to test for differences in outcome due to different estimation techniques. The estimation results are presented in Table 5 <insert significantly affect risk behaviour. Since LINC has a significantly negative coefficient and LINC2 a significantly positive coefficient, there seems to be a non-linear relationship between the income of a borrower and his risk behaviour. For low income levels, an increase in income lowers risk, whereas it increases risk after a certain threshold level of income has been passed. Positive significant coefficients for LEADER, SEC and PROBLEM suggest that a group leader takes more risk than a normal group member, that members who are more educated take more risk, and that members who have had payment problems in the past also take more risk. The negative coefficient for ACORD implies that borrowers in a borrowing group belonging to the ACORD system take less risk. The underlying reason probably is that the number of members in credit groups belonging to the ACORD system is lower. So, larger groups lead to more risk taking of the individual members, possibly due to a better scope for free riding. These results hold for both the OLS and TOBIT estimates.
In equations 2A and 2B the regressions are repeated by ignoring the insignificant terms. These regressions confirm the results suggested by equations 1A and 1B. Finally, we re-estimate the equations by replacing PROBLEM, by APROBCRED (equations 3A and 3B).
APROBCRED measures the amount of money that was involved when the borrower had problems repaying the debt, as a percentage of the size of the loan in the previous loan cycle.
This indicator serves as an alternative indicator for PROBLEM. The results of these regressions again confirm the basic message of equations 1A and 1B.
Since FACTOR2 mainly has to do with three indicators, ACCORD, VISIT and NUMBER, we also perform regressions in which FACTOR2 is replaced by one of these individual indicators. OLS and TOBIT regressions for these cases are presented in Table 6 .
The table shows that each of these individual terms, with the exception of the OLS estimate for NUMBER, are significant. Being a borrower from a credit group associated with the ACORD system has a negative effect on risk taking. The same holds for more visits among members of a credit group. An increase in the number of members of a credit group enhances risk taking of an individual borrower.
<insert Table 6 
Heterogeneity
The final step in the analysis is to estimate the heterogeneity equation (equation 7). For this we first need to develop a measure of risk heterogeneity.
The measure for risk heterogeneity:
In line with Carpenter and Sadoulet (2001) we measure risk heterogeneity (h) by: Table 7 gives descriptive statistics of h. Figure 2 graphs heterogeneity by means of kernel distributions.
<Insert Table 7 about here>
The graphs clearly show that heterogeneity in almost all cases differs from zero. This seems to imply that we have to reject the hypothesis of homogeneous matching since with homogeneous matching the risk heterogeneity within groups should be equal to zero.
However, it may be the case that this heterogeneity is caused by matching frictions, an issue we will examine by estimating equation 7.
Estimation results
The estimates of the heterogeneity equation are presented in Table 8 . 8 Again we use the OLS as well as the TOBIT estimation technique. The dependent variable in the regressions is our proxy for heterogeneity (h). It appears that the coefficient for FIRSTBEST is highly significant, strongly suggesting that homogeneous matching will not take place, even if the estimates are controlled for matching frictions.
<Insert Table 8 about here>
Conclusions
We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from two microcredit programs in Eritrea. Using the results from this survey, this paper aims to provide new insights on the empirical relevance of the homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea.
An important part of the methodology to test for homogeneous matching consists of estimating risk behaviour. This analysis suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between the income of a borrower and risk taking. Below a certain threshold level of income, an increase in income will lead to less risk taking, whereas an increase in income will increase risk taking above a certain level of income. We also find that group leaders take more risk than normal group members, that better educated borrowers take more risk, and that borrowers that have had payment problems in the past will take more risk. Moreover, we find some evidence that borrowers in larger groups will take more risk than borrowers in smaller groups.
Concerning the homogeneous matching hypothesis, our results strongly indicate that groups are formed heterogeneously. Most importantly, we do not find support for the matching frictions hypothesis, in the sense that even if we control for matching frictions, credit groups in Eritrea do not seem to consist of borrowers of the similar risk type.
Of course, some reservations with respect to our main conclusions can be made. For instance, the classification of variables in a group that primarily deals with matching frictions, and a group of variables dealing with first-best risk determinants may be criticised. More research on this is needed. Nevertheless, given the data we have, and taking into account all possible drawbacks of the methodology used, we think that our analysis, at the least, suggests that the commonly held assumption of homogeneous matching can not be confirmed for the case of Eritrea. If one accepts that groups are formed heterogeneously, an important issue is then to examine why this is so. A possible reason brought forward in some recent papers is the insurance that risky and safe borrowers may provide. This issue, however, is left for future research. CUMVAR gives the cumulative variance explained by the factors taken into account. The factor analysis is done on 323 observations (the common sample of all indicators). 
